> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs-pos.solya.app/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # Report stored-value breakage across the whole network (carte cadeau) > Aggregates unredeemable and untouched stored value AS OF THE REQUEST CLOCK: `expired*` counts instruments past their `expiresAt` that still carry a balance, `neverRedeemed*` counts live instruments never drawn on, and `total*` sums both. Voided and zero-balance instruments are excluded, and an instrument that is both expired and never redeemed is counted ONCE (under `expired*`), so the two buckets never double-count and their sum is the total at-risk value. This IS A NETWORK TOTAL: the aggregate is a `SUM`/`COUNT` over EVERY issued instrument — no page window, no sample, no truncation — so it is the figure to reconcile against. Before #3222 it folded only the first 100 instruments and silently under-reported the liability; a caller pinned to that behaviour should be corrected, not accommodated. Every figure is integer minor units and exact: the fold is integer addition and counting, with no division and no per-row rounding. It takes no parameters and never mutates. ## OpenAPI ````yaml /openapi.json get /v1/giftcards/breakage openapi: 3.0.3 info: title: Solya POS API version: 1.0.0 description: >- The Solya POS backend HTTP surface. Every documented operation is agent-ready: it carries an `operationId`, an agent-facing `description`, the `pos.*` scopes it enforces (`x-required-permissions`) and an `x-agent-tier`. Success responses return the payload as raw JSON; failures return the `ErrorResponse` envelope (`{ error: { code, message, statusCode } }`). servers: - url: / description: The backend, relative to its deployed origin. security: [] paths: /v1/giftcards/breakage: get: tags: - Instruments summary: Report stored-value breakage across the whole network (carte cadeau) description: >- Aggregates unredeemable and untouched stored value AS OF THE REQUEST CLOCK: `expired*` counts instruments past their `expiresAt` that still carry a balance, `neverRedeemed*` counts live instruments never drawn on, and `total*` sums both. Voided and zero-balance instruments are excluded, and an instrument that is both expired and never redeemed is counted ONCE (under `expired*`), so the two buckets never double-count and their sum is the total at-risk value. This IS A NETWORK TOTAL: the aggregate is a `SUM`/`COUNT` over EVERY issued instrument — no page window, no sample, no truncation — so it is the figure to reconcile against. Before #3222 it folded only the first 100 instruments and silently under-reported the liability; a caller pinned to that behaviour should be corrected, not accommodated. Every figure is integer minor units and exact: the fold is integer addition and counting, with no division and no per-row rounding. It takes no parameters and never mutates. operationId: getGiftcardBreakage responses: '200': description: The breakage totals in integer cents, plus the instrument counts. content: application/json: schema: type: object properties: expiredBalanceCents: type: integer minimum: -9007199254740991 maximum: 9007199254740991 expiredCount: type: integer minimum: -9007199254740991 maximum: 9007199254740991 neverRedeemedBalanceCents: type: integer minimum: -9007199254740991 maximum: 9007199254740991 neverRedeemedCount: type: integer minimum: -9007199254740991 maximum: 9007199254740991 totalBreakageCents: type: integer minimum: -9007199254740991 maximum: 9007199254740991 totalCount: type: integer minimum: -9007199254740991 maximum: 9007199254740991 required: - expiredBalanceCents - expiredCount - neverRedeemedBalanceCents - neverRedeemedCount - totalBreakageCents - totalCount additionalProperties: false description: >- The breakage totals in integer cents, plus the instrument counts. example: expiredBalanceCents: 1200 expiredCount: 2 neverRedeemedBalanceCents: 5000 neverRedeemedCount: 1 totalBreakageCents: 6200 totalCount: 3 '400': description: >- The request failed schema validation; `error.fieldErrors` lists the fields. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ValidationErrorResponse' '401': description: No valid credential was presented — send a bearer token. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse' '403': description: The actor is authenticated but lacks the required `pos.*` scope. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse' '500': description: An unexpected server error — safe to retry idempotent requests. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse' security: - bearerAuth: [] components: schemas: ValidationErrorResponse: type: object required: - error additionalProperties: false description: >- A `VALIDATION_FAILED` envelope carrying the offending fields in `fieldErrors`. properties: error: type: object required: - code - message - statusCode additionalProperties: false properties: code: type: string enum: - VALIDATION_FAILED message: type: string statusCode: type: integer fieldErrors: type: array description: >- One entry per rejected field: the field path and why it was rejected. items: type: object required: - field - message additionalProperties: false properties: field: type: string description: Dot-path of the offending field. message: type: string description: Why the field was rejected. ErrorResponse: type: object required: - error additionalProperties: false description: The uniform failure envelope every non-2xx response returns. properties: error: type: object required: - code - message - statusCode additionalProperties: false properties: code: type: string enum: - VALIDATION_FAILED - UNAUTHORIZED - FORBIDDEN - NOT_FOUND - CONFLICT - BUSINESS_RULE_VIOLATION - INTERNAL_ERROR description: >- Machine-readable kernel `ResultCode` — branch on this, not on `message`. message: type: string description: >- Human-readable explanation. Safe to surface; never leaks server internals. statusCode: type: integer description: >- The HTTP status, mirrored into the body so a client need not read headers. securitySchemes: bearerAuth: type: http scheme: bearer bearerFormat: JWT description: >- `Authorization: Bearer `. Accepts EITHER a Keycloak access token (scopes-in-token) OR an opaque POS session token; both resolve to the same `pos.*` scope vocabulary the route guards enforce. ````