> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs-pos.solya.app/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # Deactivate (close) a store > Soft-closes a store by flipping its `active` flag to `false` — never a physical delete (historic sales, transfers and fiscal reports still reference it), so the store still reads back as inactive and can be reopened with an update. This is the safe way to take a location out of the trading network: a closed store must not be routed sales or transfers, and tills, transfers and reporting all read the flag. Idempotent: deactivating an already-closed store is a no-op that returns it unchanged. 404s for an unknown store. PERMISSION TRAP (see solya-pos#950): the route guard accepts `pos.settings.manage`, but the use-case additionally asserts the kernel `config:manage` permission and NO `pos.settings.*` scope maps to it, so a principal authenticated by scopes alone clears the guard and then 403s inside the use-case. ## OpenAPI ````yaml /openapi.json post /v1/stores/{storeId}/deactivate openapi: 3.0.3 info: title: Solya POS API version: 1.0.0 description: >- The Solya POS backend HTTP surface. Every documented operation is agent-ready: it carries an `operationId`, an agent-facing `description`, the `pos.*` scopes it enforces (`x-required-permissions`) and an `x-agent-tier`. Success responses return the payload as raw JSON; failures return the `ErrorResponse` envelope (`{ error: { code, message, statusCode } }`). servers: - url: / description: The backend, relative to its deployed origin. security: [] paths: /v1/stores/{storeId}/deactivate: post: tags: - Network summary: Deactivate (close) a store description: >- Soft-closes a store by flipping its `active` flag to `false` — never a physical delete (historic sales, transfers and fiscal reports still reference it), so the store still reads back as inactive and can be reopened with an update. This is the safe way to take a location out of the trading network: a closed store must not be routed sales or transfers, and tills, transfers and reporting all read the flag. Idempotent: deactivating an already-closed store is a no-op that returns it unchanged. 404s for an unknown store. PERMISSION TRAP (see solya-pos#950): the route guard accepts `pos.settings.manage`, but the use-case additionally asserts the kernel `config:manage` permission and NO `pos.settings.*` scope maps to it, so a principal authenticated by scopes alone clears the guard and then 403s inside the use-case. operationId: deactivateStore parameters: - schema: type: string minLength: 1 in: path name: storeId required: true responses: '200': description: 'The closed store directory record (`active: false`).' content: application/json: schema: type: object properties: id: type: string minLength: 1 name: type: string minLength: 1 city: type: string minLength: 1 region: type: string minLength: 1 active: type: boolean required: - id - name - city - region - active additionalProperties: false description: 'The closed store directory record (`active: false`).' example: id: store-rivoli name: Boutique Rivoli city: Paris 1er region: Île-de-France active: false '400': description: >- The request failed schema validation; `error.fieldErrors` lists the fields. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ValidationErrorResponse' '401': description: No valid credential was presented — send a bearer token. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse' '403': description: The actor is authenticated but lacks the required `pos.*` scope. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse' '404': description: No resource matches the addressed identifier. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse' '422': description: The request is well-formed but violates a domain rule. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse' '500': description: An unexpected server error — safe to retry idempotent requests. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse' security: - bearerAuth: [] components: schemas: ValidationErrorResponse: type: object required: - error additionalProperties: false description: >- A `VALIDATION_FAILED` envelope carrying the offending fields in `fieldErrors`. properties: error: type: object required: - code - message - statusCode additionalProperties: false properties: code: type: string enum: - VALIDATION_FAILED message: type: string statusCode: type: integer fieldErrors: type: array description: >- One entry per rejected field: the field path and why it was rejected. items: type: object required: - field - message additionalProperties: false properties: field: type: string description: Dot-path of the offending field. message: type: string description: Why the field was rejected. ErrorResponse: type: object required: - error additionalProperties: false description: The uniform failure envelope every non-2xx response returns. properties: error: type: object required: - code - message - statusCode additionalProperties: false properties: code: type: string enum: - VALIDATION_FAILED - UNAUTHORIZED - FORBIDDEN - NOT_FOUND - CONFLICT - BUSINESS_RULE_VIOLATION - INTERNAL_ERROR description: >- Machine-readable kernel `ResultCode` — branch on this, not on `message`. message: type: string description: >- Human-readable explanation. Safe to surface; never leaks server internals. statusCode: type: integer description: >- The HTTP status, mirrored into the body so a client need not read headers. securitySchemes: bearerAuth: type: http scheme: bearer bearerFormat: JWT description: >- `Authorization: Bearer `. Accepts EITHER a Keycloak access token (scopes-in-token) OR an opaque POS session token; both resolve to the same `pos.*` scope vocabulary the route guards enforce. ````