> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs-pos.solya.app/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # Revoke a scoped role from a team member > REVOKES one built-in RBAC role grant from a member at an access scope — the mirror of `assignTeamMemberRole`. `roleId` is the built-in role id; `storeId` must match the scope the grant was made at (omit it to revoke the network-wide/franchise grant). This NARROWS what the account can do — a security-posture change — so only revoke on an explicit instruction. 404 when the member holds no such (role, scope) grant. Returns the revoked grant. PERMISSION TRAP (solya-pos#950): `x-required-permissions` says `pos.team.manage`, and that is what the router gate checks — but the use-case behind it additionally asserts the kernel permission `config:manage`, and the scope-to-kernel table (`SCOPE_KERNEL_PERMISSIONS`) maps `pos.team.manage` to NOTHING. A token-authenticated actor holding exactly the documented scope therefore passes the gate and then fails with a bare 403 from inside the use-case. Read a 403 here as a server-side grant gap, not as a malformed request, and do not retry it with a different body. ## OpenAPI ````yaml /openapi.json delete /v1/team/{memberId}/roles openapi: 3.0.3 info: title: Solya POS API version: 1.0.0 description: >- The Solya POS backend HTTP surface. Every documented operation is agent-ready: it carries an `operationId`, an agent-facing `description`, the `pos.*` scopes it enforces (`x-required-permissions`) and an `x-agent-tier`. Success responses return the payload as raw JSON; failures return the `ErrorResponse` envelope (`{ error: { code, message, statusCode } }`). servers: - url: / description: The backend, relative to its deployed origin. security: [] paths: /v1/team/{memberId}/roles: delete: tags: - Team summary: Revoke a scoped role from a team member description: >- REVOKES one built-in RBAC role grant from a member at an access scope — the mirror of `assignTeamMemberRole`. `roleId` is the built-in role id; `storeId` must match the scope the grant was made at (omit it to revoke the network-wide/franchise grant). This NARROWS what the account can do — a security-posture change — so only revoke on an explicit instruction. 404 when the member holds no such (role, scope) grant. Returns the revoked grant. PERMISSION TRAP (solya-pos#950): `x-required-permissions` says `pos.team.manage`, and that is what the router gate checks — but the use-case behind it additionally asserts the kernel permission `config:manage`, and the scope-to-kernel table (`SCOPE_KERNEL_PERMISSIONS`) maps `pos.team.manage` to NOTHING. A token-authenticated actor holding exactly the documented scope therefore passes the gate and then fails with a bare 403 from inside the use-case. Read a 403 here as a server-side grant gap, not as a malformed request, and do not retry it with a different body. operationId: revokeTeamMemberRole parameters: - schema: type: string minLength: 1 in: path name: memberId required: true description: The team-member id to act on, e.g. `user-julie`. requestBody: required: true content: application/json: schema: type: object properties: roleId: type: string minLength: 1 description: >- Built-in RBAC role id: `owner`, `manager`, `cashier` or `viewer`. storeId: description: >- Narrow the grant to one store; omit for a network-wide (franchise) grant. type: string minLength: 1 required: - roleId example: roleId: cashier responses: '200': description: The revoked actor→role→scope grant. content: application/json: schema: type: object properties: actorId: type: string roleId: type: string scope: type: object properties: level: type: string enum: - franchise - store franchiseId: type: string storeId: type: string required: - level - franchiseId additionalProperties: false required: - actorId - roleId - scope additionalProperties: false description: The revoked actor→role→scope grant. example: actorId: user-julie roleId: cashier scope: level: franchise franchiseId: solya '400': description: >- The request failed schema validation; `error.fieldErrors` lists the fields. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ValidationErrorResponse' '401': description: No valid credential was presented — send a bearer token. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse' '403': description: The actor is authenticated but lacks the required `pos.*` scope. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse' '404': description: No resource matches the addressed identifier. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse' '500': description: An unexpected server error — safe to retry idempotent requests. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/ErrorResponse' security: - bearerAuth: [] components: schemas: ValidationErrorResponse: type: object required: - error additionalProperties: false description: >- A `VALIDATION_FAILED` envelope carrying the offending fields in `fieldErrors`. properties: error: type: object required: - code - message - statusCode additionalProperties: false properties: code: type: string enum: - VALIDATION_FAILED message: type: string statusCode: type: integer fieldErrors: type: array description: >- One entry per rejected field: the field path and why it was rejected. items: type: object required: - field - message additionalProperties: false properties: field: type: string description: Dot-path of the offending field. message: type: string description: Why the field was rejected. ErrorResponse: type: object required: - error additionalProperties: false description: The uniform failure envelope every non-2xx response returns. properties: error: type: object required: - code - message - statusCode additionalProperties: false properties: code: type: string enum: - VALIDATION_FAILED - UNAUTHORIZED - FORBIDDEN - NOT_FOUND - CONFLICT - BUSINESS_RULE_VIOLATION - INTERNAL_ERROR description: >- Machine-readable kernel `ResultCode` — branch on this, not on `message`. message: type: string description: >- Human-readable explanation. Safe to surface; never leaks server internals. statusCode: type: integer description: >- The HTTP status, mirrored into the body so a client need not read headers. securitySchemes: bearerAuth: type: http scheme: bearer bearerFormat: JWT description: >- `Authorization: Bearer `. Accepts EITHER a Keycloak access token (scopes-in-token) OR an opaque POS session token; both resolve to the same `pos.*` scope vocabulary the route guards enforce. ````